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Abstract 
 
This report is a review of open literature concerning threats including sabotage and theft related 
to fissile material transport in Japan.  It is intended to aid Japanese officials in the development 
of a design basis threat.  This threat includes the external threats of the terrorist, criminal, and 
extremist, and the insider threats of the disgruntled employee, the employee forced into 
cooperation via coercion, the psychotic employee, and the criminal employee.   
 
Examination of the external terrorist threat considers Japanese demographics, known terrorist 
groups in Japan, and the international relations of Japan.  Demographically, Japan has a 
relatively homogenous population, both ethnically and religiously.  Japan is a relatively peaceful 
nation, but its history illustrates that it is not immune to terrorism. It has a history of domestic 
terrorism and the open literature points to the Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-Ha, and 
Seikijuku.  Japan supports the United States in its war on terrorism and in Iraq, which may make 
Japan a target for both international and domestic terrorists.   
 
Crime appears to remain low in Japan; however sources note that the foreign crime rate is 
increasing as the number of foreign nationals in the country increases.  Antinuclear groups’ 
recent foci have been nuclear reprocessing technology, transportation of MOX fuel, and possible 
related nuclear proliferation issues.   
 
The insider threat is first defined by the threat of the disgruntled employee.  This threat can be 
determined by studying the history of Japan’s employment system, where Keiretsu have 
provided company stability and lifetime employment.  Recent economic difficulties and an 
increase of corporate crime, due to sole reliability on the honor code, have begun to erode 
employee loyalty. 
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Executive Summary 
This report is a review of the open literature concerning threats including sabotage and theft 
related to fissile material transport in Japan.  It is intended to aid in the development of a design 
basis threat.  Restrictions on this report specify that only sources found in the open literature and 
sources written in English be reviewed.   
 
A design basis threat can be defined by the external threats of the terrorist, criminal, and 
extremist, and the insider threats of the disgruntled employee, the employee forced into 
cooperation via blackmail, the psychotic employee, and the criminal employee.   
 
Examination of the external terrorist threat considers Japanese demographics, known terrorist 
groups in Japan, and the international relations of Japan.  Demographically, Japan has a 
relatively homogenous population, both ethnically and religiously.  Ninety-nine percent of the 
estimated population of approximately one hundred and twenty seven million is ethnic Japanese, 
while the remaining one percent includes Koreans, Chinese, Brazilians, Filipinos, and people of 
other origins.  The religious breakdown shows that 84 percent practice both Shinto and 
Buddhism, 0.7 percent practice Christianity, and the balance practice various other religions.  All 
of the ethnic and religious groups are inherently peaceful in nature, but any one of them may be 
capable of terrorism if extremists are able to influence a small number of people. 
  
Known terrorist groups in Japan comprise the Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-Ha, and 
Seikijuku.  The Red Army’s goals were to overthrow the Japanese government and ignite global 
revolution through violent, guerrilla means.  The Red Army split into three factions: the Yodo 
Group, the Japanese Red Army, and the United Red Army operating in North Korea, Lebanon, 
and Japan, respectively.  Each faction eventually adopted a local doctrine and set of goals, as 
their plot of global revolution never came to fruition.  The Yodo Group adopted the philosophy 
of the North Korean leader in 1969, Kim Jong Il; the Japanese Red Army adopted the philosophy 
of the Palestinian struggle for liberation; and the United Red Army sought the overthrow of 
Japan’s monarchy.  They incited global fear and intimidation though their terrorist activities but 
were not successful on a large scale.   
 
In the late 1980s, Aum Shinrikyo, now called Aleph, sought religious and spiritual enlightenment 
in a materialistically focused Japanese society.  The cult used brainwashing techniques to gain 
and retain a large member base.  The organization had immense resources of money, people, and 
arms.  Aum Shinrikyo tried unsuccessfully to conduct biowarfare, but was eventually able to 
prove its terrorist abilities with chemical weapons.  The cult used sarin in the 1994 Matsumoto 
incident and 1995 Tokyo subway attack.  Aum Shinrikyo no longer has religious organizational 
privileges, and remains under the surveillance of the Japanese government.  Like the Red Army, 
Aum Shinrikyo’s most successful endeavor was the spread of terror and fear as a result of people 
realizing the possibility of massive terror attacks, even in relatively peaceful countries as Japan. 
 
Chukaku-Ha, the Middle Core Faction or Nucleus, sought to demonstrate frustration with 
Japan’s imperialism, the imperialism of the West, and the Gulf War through violent protests with 
rudimentary rockets and incendiary devices.  Seikijuku, or Sane Thinkers School, a right-wing 
group, seeks to protect and reinstate the role of the Emperor in Japan.   
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Lastly, examination of the external terrorist threat must take into consideration the international 
relations and policies of Japan.  These also affect Japan’s security and indicate who may be 
willing to target Japan.  Currently, Japan supports the United States in its war on terrorism and 
war in Iraq.  Such alliances may make Japan a target for both international and domestic 
terrorists.  The recent 2004 Madrid train bombings exemplify the actions of terrorists against 
countries that support U.S. policy.  As might be expected, Al Qaeda sympathizers have recently 
been discovered working in Japan.  
 
The Council on Foreign Relations contends that Japan is vulnerable to an attack from North 
Korea, due to its close proximity and good relations with the United States.  The possibility was 
made very clear when North Korea launched a long-range Taepodong Missile over the Japanese 
islands in August 1998 as well as the testing and deployment of medium-range Nodong missiles 
capable of reaching Japan.  Japan holds several grievances against North Korea as well, notably 
its weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation, including the kidnappings of 11 Japanese in the 
early 1980s, which continue to hamper progress towards improving relations.  
 
Regarding the abduction issue, the chairman of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim 
Jong-Il admitted abduction of the 11 Japanese at the September 17, 2002 Japan-North Korea 
summit meeting.  Throughout a series of Japan-North Korea Normalization and Six-Party Talks, 
Japan has continued to reiterate the importance of the unconditional release of the eight family 
members of those abducted and an inquiry into the indefinite whereabouts of the other ten 
abducted Japanese.  Japan has stated that the resolution of this issue is essential for all other 
issues to be determined.  
 
In 2001 and 2002, Japanese officials became increasingly alarmed by the encroachment of 
espionage and drug-running ships believed to be of North Korean origin into Japanese waters.   
The ships were estimated to have made the crossing from their base in North Korea up to twelve 
times a year, often releasing smaller boats that in turn launched rubber rafts to ferry agents to and 
from the Japanese coast. It is believed that the missions of these agents included gathering 
information about the outside world, smuggling money, drugs and goods, buying technology 
useful for its weapons programs, swaying influential Japanese officials in Japan regarding North 
Korea, recruiting ethnic Korean residents in Japan to gather information about South Korea, and 
conducting surveillance on U.S. and Japanese military installations.  The agents were believed to 
have relied primarily upon the approximately 200,000 Korean residents of Japan who identify 
themselves as North Korean citizens, and using threats against family members in North Korea 
as a means of coercion. North Korea is believed to be a major supplier of methamphetamines to 
Japanese organized crime syndicates.  In December 2001, Japanese coast guard patrol boats 
chased and exchanged fire with one suspected North Korean spy ship disguised as a Chinese 
fishing boat. The confrontation ended when the mystery boat sank inside China’s exclusive 
economic zone. North Korean cigarettes and a badge of the deceased leader Kim Il-Sung were 
found as some of the evidence of the ship’s origin.  Dozens of automatic weapons, a surface to 
air missile launcher and an underwater scooter capable of carrying three people were found in 
the sunken ship, along with ten bodies.   
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Even so, Japan continues to provide food aid to North Korea.  Through the World Food Program, 
Japan has sent 118,000,000 tons of food to North Korea, and through the United Nations it 
provided the equivalent of US$100,000 in response to the accidental explosion of a train on April 
22, 2001.   
 
The second component of the design basis threat is the criminal threat. Japan’s crime rate 
appears to remain low; however sources note that the foreign crime rate is increasing as the 
number of foreign nationals in the country increases.   
 
The third component of the design basis threat is antinuclear extremist individuals and groups.  
Japan has been the area of operations of a number of antinuclear groups including Greenpeace, 
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, No Nukes Asia Forum, Green Action, Plutonium Action 
Hiroshima, BUND, Plaintiffs Against Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, People of Fukui Opposing 
Nuclear Power, and Stop the Monju.  Several large, international antinuclear organizations such 
as Greenpeace, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, and BUND have been especially active 
and persuasive due to their monetary and membership resources.  The recent foci of their protests 
have been nuclear reprocessing technology, transportation of MOX fuel, and possible nuclear 
proliferation issues that could result thereof.  Examples of such demonstrations include 
Greenpeace boarding the British-flagged ship Pacific Swan in order to hang a “stop plutonium” 
sign on it as it passed through the Panama Canal.  Local organizations tend to collaborate and 
work on specific campaigns relative to their respective locations.    
 
The insider threat includes the threats of disgruntled, coerced, psychotic, and criminal 
employees.  The Japanese have historically viewed their employment by a specific company as a 
relationship where loyalty and trust are essential and training, teamwork, and hard work are 
methodologies for success.  The employee is rewarded through the very viability of the 
company.     This ensured business stability and therefore, lifetime employment. Life-long 
employment and keiretsu are both expressions of the same thing—the view of Japanese society 
as the extension of the family. However, sources note that recent economic fluctuations have hit 
business hard, and layoffs, though historically nonexistent in Japan, have begun to occur.   
 
Threats of the employee being forced into cooperating via blackmail and the psychotic employee 
must also be considered in determining the insider threat, along with the threat of the criminal 
employee.  One in 10 Japanese corporations reported corporate crime from 2001 to 2003, and 
much more crime is believed to occur undetected.  Asset misappropriation is reported to be the 
highest fraud practiced, while cybercrime and product piracy and counterfeiting comprise the 
concerns for the near future.  Training to combat fraud is virtually nonexistent in Japanese 
industry, which depends solely on the honor code.   
 
Japan is now a relatively peaceful nation, but its history illustrates that it is not immune to 
terrorism, crime, or other threats.  Information on these threats found through this open literature 
survey may be used by Japanese officials in defining a design basis threat.   
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1.   Introduction and Scope 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) have 
undertaken a cooperative study and training program focused on Japan’s system of physical 
protection for nuclear material transport.  The Action Sheet defining this cooperative work was 
signed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) on December 15, 2003 and by JNC on January 19, 2004.  The project is funded by JNC. 
 
The work is divided into four tasks.  Under Task 1, SNL, working in consultation with JNC, will 
collect and analyze baseline data on Japan’s fissile material transportation system.  The baseline 
will include: (a) an open literature review for threats including sabotage and theft related to 
fissile material transport, (b) a review and summary of transportation plans for fissile materials in 
Japan, (c) a regulations and requirements review concerning sabotage and theft of fissile material 
transport, and (d) a summary report. 
 
This report fulfills the first task as a comprehensive review of open literature sources in English 
of journals, books, news publications, and the Internet.  This report defines threats according to 
the schema in The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems by Mary Lynn Garcia 
(Garcia 2001).  According to Garcia, adversaries can be characterized in three broad groups: 
outsiders, insiders, and outsiders working in collusion with insiders.  In order to analyze the 
potential adversaries, information is required regarding their motivation, potential goals based on 
targets, numbers, capabilities, and tactics.   
 
Outsiders might include terrorists, criminals, extremists, or hackers (Freedman and Mann 1997).   
Ideological, economic or personal reasons are motivations that might prompt adversaries to 
undertake criminal actions against an institution or facility.  Ideological motivations, linked to a 
political or philosophical system, include political terrorists, antinuclear extremists and certain 
groups of philosophical or religious fanatics.  Economic motivations involve a desire for 
financial gain, where criminals might view nuclear materials or information as attractive targets 
for theft, ransom, sale, or extortion.  Personal reasons for committing a crime include a grievance 
against an employer, psychosis, or a form of recreation, such as computer hacking. 
 
An insider is defined as anyone that possesses knowledge of operations or security systems and 
has unescorted access to facilities or security interests.  A passive insider would only provide 
information.  An active, nonviolent insider might facilitate entrance and exit or disable alarms 
and communications.  An active, violent insider would participate in a violent attack and is a 
very difficult adversary to protect against.  It should be recognized that insiders can have the 
same motivation as outsiders.  It should not be assumed that an employee would be invulnerable 
to greed, dissatisfaction, or cooperating with adversaries as a result of coercion, such as a threat 
against his or her family.      
 
The local environment, including conditions outside and inside the facility, should be considered 
in any characterization of the threat.  The general attitude of the community or the presence of 
organized extremist groups can provide information on threats.  Other factors inside the facility 
such as labor issues, industrial relations policies, public relations policies, security awareness, 
and human reliability programs may also affect the potential threat.  
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A review of the demographics of the local and national population can be useful in determining a 
potential threat to a specific facility.  Any discontented faction of the population should be 
reviewed, including technically skilled people, people skilled in combat and political extremists.  
Considering the potential adversarial threats, the next section of this report will describe the 
demographics of Japan to identify known terrorist organizations and potential domestic or 
international adversaries.  
 
This report is not an exhaustive study, but it highlights findings that may help to define a threat 
and provide research leads for continued development of a threat definition for sabotage and 
theft of fissile materials during transportation in Japan. 
 13 
2.  Findings 
2.1  External Threat 
2.1.1 Terrorist Threat 
2.1.1.1 Japanese Demographics 
The terrorist threat can be defined as the sum of threats due to demographics, specifically 
ethnicity, and tendencies and conflicts resulting from them; known terrorist organizations in 
Japan; and Japan’s international relations.  
 
Japan is a relatively homogeneous country inhabited by a relatively homogeneous population of 
ethnic Japanese people.  The 2004 CIA World Fact Book states that 99 percent of the population 
of an estimated 127,333,002 people is ethnic Japanese.  It assigns an immigration rate of zero 
migrants per 1,000 people for Japan. 
 
One percent is of non-Japanese origin, including:  
 
• 511,262 Koreans,  
• 244,241 Chinese,  
• 182,232 Brazilians,  
• 89,851 Filipinos, and  
• 237,914 people of other origins.   
 
The religious makeup of the Japanese population is as follows (CIA 2004): 
 
• 84 percent practice both Shinto and Buddhism  
• 0.7 percent practice Christianity 
• 15.3 percent practice various other religions.   
 
The majority of Japanese practice a combination of both Shinto and Buddhism, although many 
do not classify everyday superstitions and practices as religious; Shinto and Buddhism are 
ingrained in much of Japanese culture. (Wikipedia 2004a)  Furthermore, Japanese do not 
necessarily strictly adhere to one specific religion; a person’s wedding may take place at a Shinto 
shrine and his funeral in a Christian church, for example.  Japanese streets and buildings are 
decorated for Christian holidays such as Christmas and Easter, while many Japanese homes have 
a prayer shrine at which Shinto gods may be offered prayers.  In fact, many Japanese are wary of 
organized religion, remembering the World War II Japanese theocracy of exaggerated 
nationalistic Shinto and the cult-like tendencies of Japanese New Religions such as Aum 
Shinrikyo, a formerly religious group now called Aleph.  History has shown the Japanese how 
religious organizations can offer opportunities for power and exploitation.   
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Although not an original religion in Japan, Islam is growing in practice.  As Islam becomes more 
prominent in Japanese society, so does the discrimination felt by Muslims.  Tomoko Yamagishi, 
in a paper presented in the War in Times of Peace conference in 2002 (Yamagishi 2002), 
describes how some Muslims immigrated to Japan towards the end of the 1980s to a prolific 
Japanese economy that offered better salaries than those they could find at home.  However, the 
Japanese government, including the Japanese police force, was not equipped to control such 
laborers, because they were solely prepared to understand and account for Japanese.  Muslim 
laborers, therefore, had free reign within the country; they were not citizens unless they married 
Japanese, and otherwise were simply not accounted for at all.  Although they were not officially 
acknowledged as being in Japan, the media made Japanese aware of the Muslims’ presence by 
portraying them negatively, since Japanese see themselves as a homogeneously populated 
country.  In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the Asian 
People Friendship Society, a non-governmental Japanese organization, along with a 
Bangladeshi-dominant Muslim group, a Pakistani-dominant Muslim group, and a Japanese 
Muslim Association held a symposium entitled Islamic Society and History.  Recent 
aggressiveness towards Muslims in Japan was highlighted, specifically citing an incident where 
Japanese police had begun close monitoring of a certain mosque and had begun arresting 
Muslims whose visas had expired.  This is believed to have occurred as a result of United States 
intelligence and pressure. 
 
In spite of this, however, Islam is on the rise in Japan, even if through conversion.  The Japan 
Times notes how many Japanese women are converting to Islam in order to marry Muslim men 
who came to Japan for work. (Nakano 1992)  Consistent with Islamic law, a potential spouse 
must convert, at least in name, to Islam in order to marry.  According to the Islamic Center in 
Setagay-ku in Tokyo, Japan, 80 new Muslims were registered in 1992, of whom most were 
Japanese women.  These women practice varying orthodoxy levels of Islam.  Some Japanese 
women put their new religion above all else in their lives, even changing jobs in order to honor 
certain practices such as the salat daily ritual of prayer, while others integrate Islamic practices 
into their Japanese lifestyles such as by wearing their veils only at certain times. 
 
Another report on the history of Islam in Japan (Nida’ul Islam Magazine 
(http://www.islam.org.au), May-June 1995), contends that there is no reliable estimate of on the 
Japanese Muslim population in Japan.  Estimates range from a few hundred to one thousand 
people that are openly practicing Islam.   
 
On the other hand, Christianity has spread on Japan over the last hundred and twenty years as 
part of its Westernization process and is greatly respected by the Japanese, even if they do not 
adhere to its creeds.  Even though less than one percent of the population is Christian, many of 
the middle class and intellectuals are Christian, so that their influence is greater than their 
numerical strength might suggest.  Christianity was introduced to Japan more than five hundred 
years ago, which also has contributed to its acceptance and propagation.  
 
Despite its relative homogeneity, Japan is not immune to discrimination by ethnicity as well as 
religion.  Yasunori Fukuoka notes that although only a fraction of one percent of Japanese 
population is Korean, Koreans are greatly discriminated against in Japanese society. (Fukuoka 
1996)   During Japanese colonization of Korea, many Koreans found it economically promising 
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to immigrate to Japan, while many were forced to do so later.  Many of these latter immigrants 
(approximately 1,700,000 to 1,800,000) returned to Korea after Imperial Japan was defeated by 
the Allied Powers in 1945 and Korea received its independence.  About 500,000 to 600,000 
Koreans, whose families had already begun to assimilate into Japanese culture, remained in 
Japan.  Many third-generation Koreans do not speak Korean at all, and a large proportion of 
Korean families use adopted Japanese family names in order to avoid discrimination.  Thus, 
many Japanese do not even recognize their interactions with Koreans, as Japanese and Korean 
people do not have any distinguishing physical characteristics.  However, Fukuoka asserts that 
Koreans are still oppressed in Japanese society today if not by law, by societal attitudes.   
 
Japanese children are only considered naturally Japanese if they are born in Japan to married 
parents of whom both are citizens of Japan.  Only if these conditions are met are children entered 
into the family's Koseki, the official family tree chronicling generations (Japan-101 2003).  Japan 
recently ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees which finally gives permanent 
resident Koreans either South Korean or North Korean national status depending on their 
geographic origin.  However, Japanese ethnicity is still an unwritten requirement to serve in a 
governmental position, and even to be a public school teacher (Fukuoka 1996). 
 
Japan is a country with relatively homogeneous demographics, though sources state the 
population is becoming more diverse ethnically as well as religiously.  These trends can be taken 
into consideration in helping to define the external terrorist threat, along with already known  
terrorist groups in Japan and internationally.  Although all of the ethnic and religious groups are 
generally peaceful in nature, any of the groups are capable of terrorism if extremists are able to 
influence even a small number of people. 
 
2.1.1.2 Known Terrorist Groups in Japan 
Although it is a very peaceful nation, Japan is not immune to terrorism and has a history of such 
activity.  The recent terrorism history of Japan includes several known terrorist groups including 
three factions of the Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-Ha, and Seikijuku.  Fortunately, most 
of the terrorist events in Japan have resulted in small numbers of casualties. They have, however, 
produced mass hysteria and are therefore believed to have been ultimately purported to incite 
intimidation (Dolan and Worden 1994).  
 
Box and McCormack (Box and McCormack 2004) describe the social situations and attitudes 
that may have aided in the formation of terrorist groups in Japan.  In the aftermath of World War 
II, Japan adopted a democratic, parliamentary system to supplant its previous totalitarian rule.  
However, with the United States managing the global system, Japan’s primary focus was on 
building and maintaining a favorable relationship with the United States.  Box and McCormack 
argue that the formation of both the Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo occurred as a result of 
dissatisfaction with this constricted focus and conformity of the Japanese government to the 
thoughts of Japan’s American advisers.  
 
Terrorism is prevalent in all forms and structures.  Box and McCormack contend that such 
groups as the Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo undeniably fit the definition of terrorist groups. 
However, it may be the repression that ensues from the narrowing of the government’s and 
society’s focus to obliterate such groups that spurs the very existence of these organizations and 
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ones like them in the first place.  Frustration due to being ignored in light of seemingly more 
urgent activities, such as fighting the current war on terrorism, may actually ignite terrorist 
activities.  Thus, right- as well as left-wing groups practice terrorism to accomplish their goals.  
The Red Army wanted to initiate global revolution to give rise to a better world, and Aum 
Shinrikyo began as a retreat to enlightenment amidst a world of chaos and overwhelming 
materialistic pressures.  Through their frustrations at failure and unwillingness to admit to the 
imperfection of their ideals, these factions lost their grip on reality and resorted to terrorism, 
justifying their actions by the current state and agendas of society (Box and McCormack 2004).   
 
 
2.1.1.2.1 Red Army 
Box and McCormack discuss how honoring the Japanese constitution came only after honoring 
the requests of and earning the trust of the United States, and therefore many civil rights 
movements were ignored.  Repression ensued and frustration simmered within groups of 
idealistic students.  These feelings were intensified in 1950 when students struggled to resist the 
Japan-South Korea Normalization Treaty which seemed to compromise Japan to the Cold War 
containment strategy.  The students also were suspicious that construction of a new airport 
represented military proliferation, and “bureaucratic infiltration” of academic institutions was 
occurring.  Students felt that non-imaginative teaching, outdated and unkempt facilities, and 
overloaded and therefore impersonal classes were not being taken seriously by the Japanese 
government.  Student demonstrators violently protested at symbolic locations by fighting with 
gebabo (violence staves), helmets, and Molotov cocktails, which were used to bomb police 
stations.  Their activities eventually reached sufficient magnitude that universities were forced to 
suspend proceedings for the entire academic year of 1968 to 1969.  Between 1968 and 1988, 
eighty-five people were killed and five thousand more suffered injuries due to these protests.  
However, even after classes were resumed, not all students gave up their fight (Box and 
McCormack, 2004). 
 
The Red Army formed in Tokyo in 1969 after the riots of the earlier 1950s and 1960s.  The Red 
Army consisted of students who were not willing to accept that their revolution had failed and 
refused to concede and  return to universities.  Their doctrine became a global declaration of war 
on the middle and upper classes.  They wanted to overthrow the Japanese government and ignite 
global revolution, because they believed current governments were not satisfying the needs of 
their peoples.  The Red Army quickly divided into three factions, the Yodo Group, the Japanese 
Red Army, and the United Red Army with common goals being to initiate a global revolution. 
 
The Yodo Group consisted of just a few dozen Japanese, but they managed to hijack a local 
airplane and force its landing in Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 
where they were welcomed by Kim Il Sung, the North Korean president at that time.  They 
emerged two years later to announce to the Japanese media that they had been reformed; their 
global outlook had evolved to solely reflect the thoughts of the DPRK.  The Yodo Group is 
believed to be the culprit behind the abductions of Japanese citizens in the late 1970s for 
recruitment purposes.  The Yodo Group members lived out their lives in North Korea, raising 
families and living extravagant lifestyles of travel and privilege with resources gathered through 
money laundering and powerful friends.   
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Another faction of the Red Army, the Japanese Red Army, saw the Palestinian struggle as a 
worthy cause in their global view, and set up a new base in Lebanon in February 1971.  The 
Japanese Red Army was primarily organized and led by Fusako Shigenobu, a woman who was 
on the international wanted list due to the Japanese Red Army’s hostage incident at The Hague.  
She was arrested in November 2000.  The Japanese Red Army joined forces with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and participated in an attack on the Lod International 
Airport in Tel Aviv in 1972.  Their violent actions resulted in the death of twenty-six people; the 
wounding of twenty-six others, mostly Puerto Rican tourists; and the death by suicide of two of 
the three Japanese Red Army members.  Other groups allied themselves with the Japanese Red 
Army to execute attacks masterminded by the Japanese Red Army on the oil refineries in Dubai 
and Singapore and the embassy in The Hague in 1974 and the United States and Swedish 
embassies in Kuala Lumpur in 1975.  In addition, the Japanese Red Army and its affiliations 
continued to rob banks and kidnap in order to fund activities.  Similar to the Yodo group, the 
Japanese Red Army also struggled with the shift of their global view of revolution to their local, 
primary task at hand: Palestine.   
 
The third faction of the Red Army remained in Japan, though they too joined forces with other 
groups.  Their union with the Tokyo-Yokohama Security Treaty Joint Struggle Committee 
resulted in the United Red Army and an abundance of pooled resources.  They saw themselves as 
the “guerrillas of the Japanese revolution” where they would incite revolution to overthrow the 
Japanese government while the other factions of the Red Army worked to do the same in their 
respective locations.  Their conjoining committee’s focused primarily on the revolution in Japan.  
Nonetheless, these ambitions soon proved to be ephemeral.  During a meeting, the United Red 
Army performed a ritual of self and group criticism, and challenged their members to cleanse 
and unify their revolutionary thoughts.  The resulting practice spiraled out of control as a gory 
purge, culminating in the death of twelve members, two police officers, and the arrest of the 
remaining five members.   
 
In the end, the Red Army never achieved its global goal of revolution; however, each faction did 
have an impact in its immediate location, as well as in Japan.  The Red Army participated in an 
additional 17 lesser publicized bombings of government and corporate buildings or symbolic 
sites in Japan, notably the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries bombing on August 30, 1974, which 
killed eight people, and the bombing of Mitsui and Company and Taisei Corporation which 
resulted in 20 casualties. (Wikipedia 2004b). 
 
Although very active in the 1970s and 1980s, the Red Army has been taken off Japan’s State 
Department watch list, (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).  Their attacks in Japan were not to 
the scale and impact that the Red Army would call successful and extremely noteworthy, but 
they did terrorize Japan, nonetheless (Box and McCormack, 2004).   
 
2.1.1.2.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
While Aum Shinrikyo terrorized Japan with its Tokyo subway sarin attack, the group had 
actually hoped to use purer, and therefore more potent, sarin which would have resulted in 
greater consequences.  Like the Red Army, the group also had many failed attempts at terror, but 
the most successful repercussion of even these futile attempts was intimidation and fear.  Box 
and McCormack illustrate the prevailing society that may have helped in the formation of the 
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cult Aum Shinrikyo.  They assert that the 1980s came to a conclusion in what may have seemed 
to be a stable and prosperous political and social environment in Japan; however, Japanese youth 
actually felt estranged due to bombardment of Western ideals of materialism and progress.  As a 
result, new religious groups emerged to offer spiritual fulfillment and identity for those Japanese 
who felt like failures in the fast-paced environment.  Likewise, Aum Shinrikyo began as a 
religious organization designed to offer elucidation and freedom at a time of momentous 
rationalization and Westernization.  This possible reality of an imaginative world of new 
theology and eccentric practices appealed to Japanese young adults, as they were accustomed to 
virtual ideas generated from computer games, “manga”, and TV, which all visualized and 
animated extreme versions of the forces of good and evil that they saw clashing in their society 
(Box and McCormack 2004). 
 
Aum Shinsen no Kai was formed in 1984, and subsequently became the religious organization 
Aum Shinrikyo in July 1987.  It was headed by Chizo Matsumoto, more commonly known as 
Shoko Asahara, “the one who has attained supreme truth.”  Asahara was the self-proclaimed 
guru and holy man whose doomsday preaching seemed to practically equate death and liberation.  
Recruitment for the organization involved brainwashing practices including sleep deprivation, 
isolation, and ingestion of drugs followed by Asahara’s prophetic teachings.  Young Japanese, 
including academically able scientists, medical doctors, and engineers, searching for structure 
and such ideas as truth and political and social reform, willingly, at first at least, pledged 
complete obedience and devotion to the guru.  They gave up their lives and assets to feed the 
organization’s need for membership and 300 million to one billion US dollars’ worth of assets.  
Due to its religious founding, businesses also provided tax-exempt money for Aum to work.  
Internationalization was also a success for Aum, resulting in the formation of sects in Russia, 
Germany, the United States, Sri Lanka, and Australia via the internet.  In order to control 
membership, Asahara killed members who did not comply and outside individuals who 
questioned the practices of Aum.  At the time of the infamous subway attack in 1995, Aum 
Shinrikyo’s membership totaled an approximate ten thousand people (Reader 2000).   
 
Ely Karmon describes how the religious side of the cult casually incorporated Hinduism, early 
Buddhism, yoga, and alleged miracles all for the purpose of achieving some heightened state of 
being such as that of the guru, Asahara (Karmon 1999).  By proclaiming himself as Jesus, 
Asahara was able to incorporate the idea of the Last Judgment and final battle of Armageddon 
from the Judeo-Christian culture into his teachings.  Thus, Asahara was able to focus much of his 
propaganda on the urgent subject of saving the world, though this purpose changed to saving the 
chosen themselves in 1988–1989, and eventually to “survival through combat” in 1994.  Aum 
taught that through participation in spiritual cleansings and rituals, members would become 
resistant to atomic, biological, and chemical attacks. 
 
Only after the defeat of twenty-five of the members running in the 1990 Japanese general 
election did frustration lead Aum to a new mission to challenge the state before the apocalypse 
that Asahara prophesied was coming in 1999, 1997, and, as eventually decided, 1995.  This 
political loss prompted a critical change in the internal structure, purpose, and means to achieve 
this new purpose by initiating an urgent mission to save mankind facing the ultimate chaos of 
Armageddon.  Asahara and inner circle disciples began to preach that Aum Shinrikyo was being 
attacked by biological and chemical weapons in an attempt to justify the acquisition of similar 
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weapons. Through his eclectic teachings, Asahara proclaimed that in order to save Japan, the 
current governmental system needed to be annihilated and supplanted by an “Aum dictatorship” 
(Box and McCormack 2004).   
 
Aum Shinrikyo also has a thread of anti-Semitism in its history and ideologies.  Unusual and 
foreign to Japan, many scholars believe that Japanese anti-Semitism is rooted in anti-
Westernization or anti-Americanism, by identifying Jewish culture as the epitome of materialism 
and Westernization.  In Japanese history, anti-Semitism is virtually non-existent, since Judaism 
was never a threat to any other religion, and Japanese never really differentiated between Jewish 
and other non-Japanese people.  Nonetheless, one of the ten chapters comprising Aum’s website 
is devoted entirely to anti-Semitism, especially on the Russian version of the website.  Its 
statements are consistent with modern right-wing anti-Semitism doctrines (Karmon 1999). 
 
Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy from the Henry L. Stimson Center report that while 
Aum Shinrikyo did manage to attack somewhat successfully with sarin two times, the cult had 
greater ambitions in mind that were a flop from beginning to end despite the generous monetary, 
facility, and technical resources at hand (Smithson and Levy 2000),  They hypothesize that 
Aum’s inability to manufacture and disseminate its biological and chemical weapons (save sarin) 
may actually discourage other terrorists from wasting time, money, and resources on such 
endeavors.  Nevertheless, Aum touted a greatly exaggerated list of accomplishments, including 
the supposed acquisition of a seed culture of the Ebola virus after returning from a trip to Zaire 
where Asahara and his followers allegedly administered aid to victims of that virus.  He claimed 
to have obtained a sample of Q fever from Australia as well as anthrax spores, poisonous snake 
venom, mushroom spores, and the means to make botulinum toxin.  None of these biological 
weapons programs were successful, though Aum executed nine biowarfare pseudo-attacks of 
which only five were even notable enough to have been documented.  The first involved venting 
botulinum toxin—that had not even sickened exposed lab rats—from six hidden vents in a van as 
it drove through Tokyo, Narita International Airport, and the United States naval bases at 
Yokohama and Yokosuka.  According to police reports, the second and third incidents in June 
and July of 1993 consisted of a failed aerosolization of a veterinary inoculation anthrax strain 
mixture via an industrial sprayer and fan on top of an eight-story building where sect members in 
full protection gear worked for four days.  However, Smithson and Levy state that these reports 
were greatly exaggerated; only steam was apparently seen rising from the building and a moldy 
smell reported.  Moreover, the amount of mixture needed for a four-day release would have been 
substantial.  Thus, despite the generous amount of money that Aum spent on laboratories and 
even helicopters for proposed dispersal units, its biowarfare program never came to fruition. 
 
Aum’s chemical warfare program proved more successful in its ten attacks on Japanese people.  
Aum initially tried to buy chemical weapons from alleged American and Russian sources, but 
failed and thus changed tactics.  It began to acquire large amounts of chemical compounds in 
order to create the desired poisonous agents itself.  The Aum technical expertise was much more 
adept with chemical synthesis than it was with bioweapon development.  They successfully 
concocted numerous chemical agents including nerve agent VX, tabun, soman, mustard, 
hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, and of course, sarin.  Only VX and sarin were produced in 
significant quantities; the former was used for attacks on opponents of Aum Shinrikyo in 1994 
and 1995, and the latter for attacks on Matsumoto Castle and the Tokyo subway system.  
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Asahara’s greed and ambition demanded the construction of several new production laboratories 
disguised as shrines, notably the sarin plant, Satyan 7.  Aum’s chief scientist advised Asahara 
that the plant could produce an estimated 70 tons of sarin after 40 days of operation; however 
that was not good enough for Asahara.  In 1993 he ordered his fleet of scientists and engineers 
increased from 18 to more than 100 at Satyan 7.  Despite such state-of-the-art facilities, that in 
some cases were the primary attraction for membership in the organization for students, 
Asahara’s pressure on production lead to facility leakage problems.  Residents near the Satyan 7 
plant filed several complaints with local police of toxic vapors exhausting from the shrine, but 
Asahara denied any accusations and instead claimed that United States forces had attacked Aum 
with chemical agents. 
 
Aum’s sarin was soon tested on a rival religious cult in order to confirm its fatal potency and to 
incite a war on Japan in order to legitimize Asahara’s claims of apocalypse.  However, like 
Aum’s bioweapon administration, the first two disseminations of sarin backfired–literally.  A 
sprayer affixed to a van was again utilized, however the nozzle clogged and back sprayed in the 
first attempt.  In the second attempt, the sect’s security chief got what should have been a lethal 
dose of sarin, and only quick administration of anti-nerve agent supplements secured his 
survival.  The third attack proved to be more successful, killing seven and hospitalizing 58 
residents of Matsumoto (Smithson and Levy 2000).  Release of 12 liters of Sarin on June 27, 
1994, between 10:40 and 10:50 p.m. at the Matsumoto Castle in Matsumo City exposed 600 
people, including the 95 response personnel, a duty doctor, and residents.  Response crews did 
not initially suspect terrorism, but perhaps a severe case of food poisoning, and were therefore 
unequipped to handle the magnitude of the event (Nakajima et al. 1997).   
 
Smithson and Levy assert that the motivation for the attack at Matsumoto arose from a civil law 
suit filed against Aum Shinrikyo questioning Aum’s purchase of some land.  Aum sought to 
ward off an anticipated unfavorable ruling by killing the three judges with sarin gas, but by the 
time the cult members arrived at the courthouse, the judges had already retired to their 
dormitories.  The cult altered its plans to accommodate this change of events, and dripped liquid 
sarin onto a heater to vent it to the open windows of the sleeping Matsumoto Castle inhabitants.  
Fortunately for the judges, the breeze did not bring enough sarin their way to cause fatality, but it 
did for other residents who had left their windows open for the night.  In the aftermath of the 
attack, Aum sent letters to police and media claiming that the police’s suspect was incapable of 
creating and administering sarin, warned of a future indoor attack in a subway, and stubbornly 
blamed the United States for the Matsumoto gassing (Smithson and Levy 2000).   
 
Like the Matsumoto incident, Aum Shinrikyo’s most famous sarin attack was again executed to 
thwart a perceived threat from authorities.  Through Aum’s guise of being a legitimate religious 
organization and careful logistical planning, it was able to keep itself free from the suspicion of 
authorities for most of its existence until it executed the gassing of the Tokyo subway system.  
Police had confirmed nearby residents’ suspicions that Aum was producing poisonous agents by 
testing soil samples, yet the legal system did not allow Japanese authorities to halt Aum with the 
available evidence.  After the Matsumoto incident, Asahara ordered that all of the sarin be 
destroyed, and Satyan 7 was converted to the shrine it was claimed to be in February 1995.   
Media, police, and residents were invited to visit the holy temple to dispel fears of Aum’s 
wrongdoing.  However, the police eventually received the legal authorization to extensively 
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search the facility.  While they prepared to do so, two Aum members inside the Self Defense 
Forces warned Asahara of the invasion approaching on March 22, 1995.  On March 18, 1995, the 
weekend before the police investigation was to occur, Asahara and several inner circle members 
masterminded an attack to discourage authorities from searching their compound. They quickly 
engineered the plans for an attack on the subway lines that intersect in the city center, and that 
carry the police force shift change.  Two top scientists, after unsuccessfully trying to explain to 
Asahara that all of the sarin was diluted and the ingredients dispersed in hidden locations,   
reluctantly and painstakingly prepared two gallons of very impure sarin in record time.  The 
assassins practiced puncturing plastic bags of water with sharpened umbrella tips.  While 
preparation for the subway operation was underway, other Aum members firebombed several 
buildings in Tokyo, and left fake fliers from a rival sect threatening to wage war on Aum 
Shinrikyo in order to try to keep Aum away from the blame and confuse police. 
 
Aum Shrinkyo attacked Tokyo’s subway system between 7:46 and 8:01 on the morning of 
March 20, 1995.  Five attackers stabbed and successfully punctured a total of eight of eleven 
bags of sarin disguised in newspapers before exiting the cars and meeting their getaway drivers.  
Subway operators eventually were forced to shutdown all three subway lines and twenty-six 
stations.  Throughout the course of the day, 5,510 casualties reported to medical centers of which 
4,470 were psychogenic patients and 54 were critically or severely wounded.  The gassing 
resulted in 12 fatalities, and widespread fear in Japan, as well as the rest of the world.  Clean-up 
of the subway took place immediately, but ridership remained below average in the following 
days. 
 
After Aum Shinrikyo’s attack on the Tokyo subway, the government was finally able to take 
action and arrest over 200 elite members of Aum, strip the organization of its religious status, 
and put the cult under surveillance (Box and McCormack 2004).  Before Asahara was found on 
May 16, 1995, he sent a videotape to Japanese authorities stating that he and many of his 
followers were infected with Q fever because of attacks from the United States, and could not 
come out of hiding (Smithson and Levy 2000).  Asahara was sentenced in February 2004, and 
subsequently received the death penalty for crimes associated with the 1995 subway attack.  (US 
DOS 2004a). 
 
Despite law enforcement crackdowns, the cult’s membership and resource gathering proliferated; 
Aum practically doubled its member force by attracting 2,700 new members in 1997, and totaled 
an estimated 20 million dollars’ worth of assets by 1999.  In retaliation against the crackdowns, 
several Aum members tried to attack the Tokyo subway system again in May and June of 1995 
by engineering hydrogen cyanide bombs that were thwarted before detonation by vigilant 
subway employees.  Aum Shinrikyo members not incarcerated also threatened the Moscow 
subway system with a sarin attack (Smithson and Levy 2000).  According to the United States 
Embassy in Japan, in July 2001 several Russian Aum Shinrikyo followers were arrested under 
the suspicion of a plan to bomb the Imperial Palace in Tokyo in order to free Asahara and take 
him to Russia.  In 1999, in the continuing aftermath of the subway attack, the Japanese 
government passed legislation allowing authorities to look more immediately and aggressively 
into suspicious activities of individuals and groups. The Public Security Intelligence Agency also 
acquired the legislation necessary to continue its surveillance of the Aum Shinrikyo cult until 
2005 as allowed by the Public Security Commission.  In January 2000 Fumihiro Joyu assumed 
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leadership of Aum, changed the name to Aleph, and supposedly rejected the ideals of Asahara 
and his sybilic teachings.  Recruitment activities were curbed beginning in 2001 because of 
public suspicion, and current membership stands at less than 1,000 members located primarily in 
Japan. A small branch with several hundred members has emerged in Russia (USDOS 2004b). 
 
Aum Shinrikyo was a well established organization with internal structure, monetary resources, 
substantial amounts of weapons, a large base of membership—including international 
membership—and intellectual and technical capability.  Although many of Aum’s ambitions 
failed miserably, several attacks were successful enough to cause fatality and mass injury, and 
most of all, incite terror and fear in Japanese and the global community (Smithson and Levy 
2000). 
 
2.1.1.2.3 Chukaku-Ha 
Several other terrorist organizations, including the Chukaku-Ha, had less impact but contribute to 
Japan’s history of terrorism.  In 1957 the Chukaku-Ha, meaning Middle Core Faction or 
Nucleus, formed from remnants of the Japanese Communist Party and a small clandestine 
operations group, the Kansai Revolutionary Army.  Combined, Chukaku-Ha is the largest 
domestic militia group in Japan comprising 3,500 members.  Chukaku-Ha protests what they 
consider Japan’s imperialism, imperialism of the West, and the Gulf War—specifically it 
protested the development of Tokyo's Narita airport, which was interpreted as Japanese aid to the 
Gulf War.  Chukaku-Ha mainly organizes and participates in protests and demonstrations that 
could include the use of rudimentary rockets and incendiary devices with the intent to arouse 
awareness and hurt property, but not necessarily to harm citizens.  Chukaku-Ha’s activity in 
Japan was exemplified by actions during the 1993 G-7 Summit when Chukaku-Ha fired no less 
than four rockets at the United States Army Base at Zama.  They have not been active recently.  
Their primary sources of income are membership dues, member news publications, and various 
fundraising efforts (US DOS 2004a). 
 
2.1.1.2.4 Seikijuku 
Seikijuku, or Sane Thinkers School, is a right-wing group active in Japan that in January 1991 
shot the mayor of Nagasaki.  Dispute and violence between left-wing and right-wing groups is 
not uncommon regarding issues such as the role of the Emperors of Japan (Dolan and Worden 
1994). 
 
2.1.1.3 International Relations 
International relations, as part of a modern global system, help determine terror activities within 
Japan indirectly by creating environments that may encourage rebellion and terrorism (Box and 
McCormack 2004).  International relations and policies also directly affect Japan and the 
potential for terrorist activity on its islands.  Japan’s support of the United States’ current war on 
terror and in Iraq is an example of Japan’s multilateralism that may impact and compromise its 
security.  The Council of Foreign Relations reports that Japan’s sympathy for the United States 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and support for its war on terror is quite natural 
considering Japan’s own experience of terrorism with the 1995 sarin attack and the death of 24 
Japanese in the World Trade Center attack.  It also notes that this support may provide an avenue 
for the weakening of Japan’s own security. In the wake of the September attacks Japan was able 
to pass legislation enabling Japan to send troops to Afghanistan and to activate its armed Self 
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Defense Forces, which the Council of Foreign Relations contends is significant, since Japan has 
worked hard since the end of World War II to embrace and project pacifism in both principle and 
practice (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).   
 
The Japanese Diet passed the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Law in July 2003 enabling Japan to 
dispatch its Self-Defense Forces for humanitarian aid purposes to Iraq and subsequently passed 
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in October 2003 allowing for a six-month extension of 
the former legislation.  The law provides for air transportation for US troops and supply of 40 
percent of the fuel consumed by United States naval forces.  Furthermore, Japan has ratified 
several treaties which will encourage collaboration with the United States, other Asian countries, 
and other additional countries in providing information and intelligence and improving border 
security.  Japan has taken the initiative to inform and prepare other nations in the region of East 
Asia by holding seminars on counterterrorism measures such as immigration and export control, 
aviation security, law enforcement, and countermeasures to discourage terrorist financing. (US 
DOS 2004b).   
 
Dispatch of the Self Defense Forces is a controversial issue in Japan, because it is the first major 
incident since the conclusion of World War II in which Japan has deployed troops 
internationally.  Much of the Japanese public views this as a step beyond self-defense (Wikipedia 
2004c), and it did not occur without internal opposition.  In February 2003 the Japanese Prime 
Minister, Junichiro Koizumi struggled with decisions about whether to support the United States’ 
war in Iraq and Koizumi’s political party, or to accede to the voice of the eighty percent majority 
of Japanese citizens who oppose any Japanese involvement with war in Iraq (Marquand 2003).  
On January 18, 2003, thousands of Japanese protestors of Japanese support of the war in Iraq 
demonstrated near Tokyo, and on January 19, 2003, 300 protestors organized at the US naval 
base in Yokosuka, which accommodates the USS Kitty Hawk (Revolutionary Worker 2003).  
Greenpeace Japan has also helped to orchestrate demonstrations in Tokyo to protest Japanese 
involvement in the war on Iraq (Greenpeace Japan 2003).   
 
The Council on Foreign Relations contends that Japan is vulnerable to an attack from North 
Korea, due to its close proximity and good relations with the United States.  The possibility was 
made very clear when North Korea launched a long-range Taepodong Missile over the Japanese 
islands in August 1998 as well as the testing and deployment of medium-range Nodong missiles 
capable of reaching Japan.  Japan holds several grievances against North Korea as well, notably 
its weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation, including the kidnappings of 11 Japanese in the 
early 1980s, which continue to hamper progress towards improving relations (Council on 
Foreign Relations 2004).  According to “Japan-North Korea Relations” released in May 2004 by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the government of Japan aims to “normalize the 
relationship with North Korea in a manner that would contribute to the peace and stability of the 
Northeast Asian region, in close co-ordination with the United States of America and the 
Republic of Korea.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2004).  However, the release 
contends, such actions are taking time to materialize, because communication between the two 
countries is provisional. At the last Six Party Talks all parties, including Japan, the United States, 
South Korea, China, Russia, and North Korea, agreed to reconvene at the end of June 2004.  
Japan’s most outstanding grievances with North Korea include the resolution of the abduction 
issue and security and nuclear issues.   
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Regarding the abduction issue, the chairman of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim 
Jong-Il admitted abduction of the 11 Japanese at the September 17, 2002 Japan-North Korea 
summit meeting.  Throughout a series of Japan-North Korea Normalization and Six-Party Talks, 
Japan has continued to reiterate the importance of the unconditional release of the eight family 
members of those abducted and an inquiry into the indefinite whereabouts of the other ten 
abducted Japanese.  Japan has stated that the resolution of this issue is essential for all other 
issues to be determined.   
 
Until recently, as a result of the 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework by the United States and 
North Korea, the United States supplied light-water reactors and 500,000 tons of heavy oil 
annually to North Korea in response to North Korea freezing its graphite-moderated reactors and 
other nuclear activities.  This agreement was officially established in 1995 as the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).  However, on December 31, 2002, North 
Korea refused inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of its nuclear facilities.  On 
January 10, 2001, North Korea announced its abandonment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
the Security Council of the United Nations discussed the matter soon afterwards.  North Korea, 
at the April 23-25, 2001, Three-Party Talks with the United States, China, and Republic of 
Korea, declared that all spent fuel rods had been reprocessed and used in the fabrication of 
nuclear weapons.  Relations remain strained, though the most recent and third Six-Party Talks 
took place May 11-15, 2004, in Beijing. Denuclearization of Korea as a whole was agreed upon 
as the most important objective by all six parties present.  They also agreed on the necessity to 
freeze North Korea’s nuclear program as the initial step towards the completion of this 
denuclearization goal.  The parties agreed that such Six-Party Talks were a fair and effective 
means in order to achieve the necessary communication and subsequent actions required for 
success of normalization of relations and their stated intentions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan 2004). 
  
In 2001 and 2002, Japanese officials became increasingly alarmed by the encroachment of 
espionage and drug-running ships believed to be of North Korean origin into Japanese waters.   
The ships were estimated to have made the crossing from their base in North Korea up to twelve 
times a year, often releasing smaller boats that in turn launched rubber rafts to ferry agents to and 
from the Japanese coast. It is believed that the missions of these agents included gathering 
information about the outside world, smuggling money, drugs and goods, buying technology 
useful for its weapons programs, swaying influential Japanese officials in Japan regarding North 
Korea, recruiting ethnic Korean residents in Japan to gather information about South Korea, and 
conducting surveillance on U.S. and Japanese military installations.  The agents were believed to 
have relied primarily upon the approximately 200,000 Korean residents of Japan who identify 
themselves as North Korean citizens, and using threats against family members in North Korea 
as a means of coercion. North Korea is believed to be a major supplier of methamphetamines to 
Japanese organized crime syndicates.  In December 2001, Japanese coast guard patrol boats 
chased and exchanged fire with one suspected North Korean spy ship disguised as a Chinese 
fishing boat. The confrontation ended when the mystery boat sank inside China’s exclusive 
economic zone. North Korean cigarettes and a badge of the deceased leader Kim Il-Sung were 
found as some of the evidence of the ship’s origin.  Dozens of automatic weapons, a surface to 
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air missile launcher and an underwater scooter capable of carrying three people were found in 
the sunken ship, along with ten bodies.   
 
Even so, Japan continues to provide food aid to North Korea.  Through the World Food Program, 
Japan has sent 118,000,000 tons of food to North Korea, and through the United Nations it 
provided the equivalent of US$100,000 in response to the accidental explosion of a train on April 
22, 2001.   
 
Besides domestic frustration at Japan’s support of the war in Iraq, outside terrorists may 
bookmark Japan as a target for attacks, as Madrid was chosen in the recent bombings of the 
Madrid train system in 2004.  In that attack, on March 11, 2004, ten of thirteen bombs were 
detonated via mobile phones inside train carriage cars in Madrid, Spain at unintentionally 
staggered times in the early morning rush hour.  One hundred ninety civilians were killed and 
more than 1,800 were left wounded (Goodman 2004).  While the investigation of the Madrid 
bombings was still underway, on March 30, 2004, Spanish investigation authorities announced 
that their examination focused on the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.  Many of those 
arrested and suspected are of Moroccan origin, and several are believed to have connections to 
the al-Qaeda leader in Spain.  A videotape of the alleged al-Qaeda military leader in Europe 
uncovered on March 14 warns of continued bloodshed if "collaboration with the criminals Bush 
and his allies" is continued.  In addition, BBC news sources describe that the Moroccan Islamic 
Combatant Group organized in the early 1990s in Afghanistan, Western Europe and Morocco 
with two main missions: to establish an Islamic state, and to encourage and assist al-Qaeda’s 
Jihad against the Western world and those who support it (BBC News 2004). 
 
Japanese citizens have been specifically targeted in Iraq.  Two Japanese journalists and a 
Japanese volunteer in Iraq were kidnapped by Iraqi rebels as a threat to the Japanese 
government; the Islamic Clerics Committee was fortunately able to coordinate their releases 
(Wikipedia 2004c).  Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the leader of an Islamic militant group with 
connections to al-Qaeda, is quoted as stating, “We will hit with a fist of iron all those supporting 
the Americans or (interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad) Allawi or his cronies”  as part of an explicit 
threat to Japan.  Al-Zarqawi states that they must withdraw their troops from Iraq or Japanese 
troops will suffer massive explosions from car bombs (Associated Press 2004).   
 
Not only are Japanese been singled out and threatened overseas, but seven people with suspected 
links to al-Qaeda were arrested in Japan at the beginning of June, 2004.  One of the detainees is 
suspected of having links specifically to a group fighting for the liberation of Kashmir, an area to 
which both India and Pakistan believe they hold rightful ownership.  Al Qaeda and Jihad 
followers have threatened Japan for sending troops to Iraq, and do not segregate the Kashmir 
issue from the current war being waged in Iraq (Reuters 2004).  According to an article in the 
Daily Herald on May 30, 2004, a Frenchman, Lionel Dumont, was the first al Qaeda agent to 
penetrate Japan.  Dumont traveled, lived, and worked in Japan several times for over a year 
beginning in 2002 with a false passport and without arousing suspicion of Japanese authorities, 
employers, or landlords even though he had been placed on the world’s most wanted list in 1999 
following his escape from Sarajevo prison.  In France, Dumont had been a member of the gang 
Roubaix and had been sentenced to life imprisonment for a number of crimes as a result of his 
involvement.  He was also sentenced to 20 years for the killing of a Bosnian policeman during 
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robberies when fighting alongside other Muslims.  The Roubaix gang is suspected to be 
financing a radical Muslim system through its robberies.  Another member of the gang, an 
Algerian, Ahmed Ressam, was linked to plans to plant a bomb in the Los Angeles airport in 
2000, and was convicted in the United States.  Dumont is a convert to Islam believed to have ties 
to al Qaeda and who was attempting to initiate an active operation in Japan.  An additional five 
members, three Bangladeshis, an Indian, and a Mali national, who remained in contact with 
Dumont have been arrested for violation of immigration laws including use of false passports 
(Talmadge 2004). 
 
In light of these events, Japan has begun to reduce the number of illegal immigrants.  In 2003 
50,000 foreigners were deported, and Japanese authorities aim to deport another half of its illegal 
immigrant population of 250,000.  These deportations are a direct result of the discovery of 
Dumont and that he entered, lived in, and left Japan undetected.  According to polls, half of 
Japanese feel that immigrants augment Japanese society, while the other half deem such 
foreigners as having a negative affect on society.  The latter viewpoint is believed to be enhanced 
by media discrimination, while Amnesty International Japan reminds that only two percent of all 
crimes in Japan are committed by people not of Japanese origin.  (Mc Curry 2004) 
 
The terrorist threat in Japan includes threats created from demographic friction and tendencies, 
terrorist groups original to Japan, and affiliations with foreign policies.  Known terrorist 
organizations persist in Japan today, even if they are currently under governmental surveillance.  
Both the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo remain on the United States’ terrorist watch 
list per 2003 due to their perceived potential of posing a threat.  Conversely, Yasufumi Asai and 
Jeffery L. Arnold argue that the current probability of terrorist attacks on Japanese soil is 
minimal, because Japan is geographically isolated as an island, has well-protected borders, is 
relatively homogeneous in population, has a stable governmental system, has control over 
terrorist groups historically active in Japan such as the Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo, and has 
followed the United States’ suggested actions in the war against terror, such as the freezing of 
terrorists’ assets.  However, Japan’s close ties with the United States in the US-led war on 
terrorism could actually be one of many causes of terrorism in Japan’s history and future (Asai 
and Arnold 2003). 
2.1.2 Criminal Threat 
The criminal threat can be defined by examining the history of Japan’s crime rate.  According to 
UK Trade & Investment (UK Trade and Investment 2003), the Japanese have long boasted about 
the degree of safety and security in their country.  While the crime rate has risen in recent years, 
it is still well below the threshold of concern for western countries.  The 1995 Tokyo subway 
sarin gas attack and an increase in car crimes have helped to undermine and erode some Japanese 
citizens’ trust in the safety and security of their country.  Japanese attitude gives the full 
responsibility of combating crime to their government, and therefore Japan’s National Police 
Agency manages all police activities of its 250,000 full-time officers distributed throughout the 
Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan units.  The Japanese police system is organized into koban and 
keisatsu-cho, or local police stations where liaison with local communities occurs for patrol and 
crime control.  However, UK Trade & Investment reminds that the Japanese have a relatively 
young police industry and establishment, and therefore immature experience relative to other 
nations’ police systems. 
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The number of crimes committed in 2003 by Japanese citizens amounts to 370,877 compared to 
a total Japanese population of 127,435,000 people (Japan Reference 2004).  However, foreign 
crime has been increasing, jumping 16.9 percent from 2002 to 2003. The number of foreigners in 
the country has been increasing as well, from 1,075,317 in 1990 to 1,686,444 in 2000 and 1.9 
million in 2003.  This represents about a 45 percent increase in registered foreigners over ten 
years, as compared to Japanese citizens’ annual growth rate average of about two percent.  In 
2003, Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) arrested 20,007 foreign nationals in connection 
with 40,615 crimes and offenses.  Offenses include such minor violations as visa overstay, drug 
use, illegal weapon possession, speeding, prostitution, etc., and exclude all violent crimes or 
crimes causing damage to people or property.  Therefore, the number of foreigners arrested for 
serious crimes committed in 2003 was 8,725.  Total percentage of crimes and offenses 
committed and crimes committed, respectively, by nationality in 2003 were as follows: 
 
• 83.3% and 74.5% were Asian,  
• 10.9% and 17.7% South American,  
• 1.3% and 2.2% North American,  
• 1.5% and 2%European  
• 1.2% and 1.8% Russian,  
• 1.3% and 0.9% African, and  
• 0.5% and 0.8% Oceanian. 
 
Foreign nationals are commonly singled out when an arrest is to be made because they do not 
necessarily look like Japanese and are therefore easy to identify, and they do not necessarily 
speak Japanese well, requiring the involvement of authorities for even petty crimes that Japanese 
citizens might have simply settled themselves.  Japan Reference points out that this assertion 
needs to be taken into consideration (Japan Reference 2004). 
 
Breaking down the crime statistics even further, the Japan National Police Agency reported a 
total of 2,790,000 penal code crime cases known to the public in Japan in 2003.  Of this number,  
 
• 13,658 were felonious offences, 
• 2,263,000 were larceny offences,  
• 78,759 were violent offences, 
• 74,754 were intellectual offences, 
• and 13,034 were moral offences (Statistics Bureau 2004). 
 
The crime rate in Japan is relatively low; however, foreign crime may be increasing.   
2.1.3 Antinuclear Extremist Threat 
In continuing to consider factors that may impact the definition of threat to Japan, the antinuclear 
extremist threat is one that consists of currently active extremists from several antinuclear 
organizations including Greenpeace, Plutonium Action Hiroshima, Citizens’ Nuclear 
Information Center, No Nukes Asia Forum and BUND to focus our study.  These groups protest 
all different forms of nuclear technology from peaceful uses to weapons proliferation. 
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2.1.3.1 Greenpeace 
Greenpeace is a global, comprehensive organization with many social grievances, many nuclear-
related.  Greenpeace Japan, the Greenpeace organizational branch in Japan, focuses largely on 
the issue of halting Japan’s production of mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuel, especially opposing 
open sea transportation and Japan’s proposed plan to use MOX in thermal reactors (Greenpeace 
Japan 2002).  The shipment of MOX fuel is a prominent grievance of Greenpeace International, 
as illustrated by their numerous press releases on the topic, international lobbying efforts, and 
global protests.  In February 1998, Greenpeace even went so far as to board the British-flagged 
Pacific Swan carrying a shipment of waste, according to Greenpeace’s website, when it passed 
through the Panama Canal in order to hang a banner reading “stop plutonium” and prove that the 
vessel was unguarded and its contents at risk for theft and proliferation.  When the Pacific Teal 
carrying MOX fuel reached the pacific coast of Japan near the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
from France, the Greenpeace ship Arctic Sunrise was among the first to greet it carrying its own 
cargo of protestors and banners foreshadowing demonstrations on shore (Greenpeace 1999).  In 
Fall 2002, Greenpeace again focused on the voyage of the Pacific Teal and its security vessel, 
the Pacific Pintail, from Takahama, Japan, to the United Kingdom and back.  However, 
according to their April 2002 press release, they do not simply oppose the transportation of MOX 
fuel, but are skeptical of the United Kingdom’s reprocessing facilities, BNFL, alleging they have 
been under scrutiny for falsifying data and safety documents.  Greenpeace also contends that the 
cask used for the MOX fuel shipment has not been approved by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and, in fact, was rejected when its precursor was reviewed.  Greenpeace encourages and 
supports coastal countries to create regulations and legislation to pressure Japan and the 
countries contracted for reprocessing Japan’s fuel to comply to high standards for maritime 
transportation practices, if not halt operations (Greenpeace 2002).  The Greenpeace Japan 
website offers articles and “cyberaction” outreach for the public.  Their website also maintains a 
link on its website (http://www.greenpeace.or.jp/index_en_html) devoted entirely to protesting 
nuclear issues.   
 
2.1.3.2 Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center 
The Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) is an organization whose sole focus is 
opposing nuclear development and ending any dependence on and use of nuclear technologies in 
Japan.  The CNIC was established in Tokyo in 1975, and their most prominent comprehensive 
work since then has been the coordination and funding of a study on the use of MOX fuel in 
light-water reactors from 1995 to 1997 (Tagaki, et al. 1997).  This International MOX 
Assessment report entitled “Comprehensive Social Impact Assessment of MOX Use in Light 
Water Reactors” scrutinizes the transportation of MOX fuel.  The report concludes that Japan is 
not equipped to handle fuel reprocessing safely, providing evidence of inconsistencies in 
regulations.  It points out that Japan was the last country to develop an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) process, and highlights its history of accidents experienced from skewed and 
undisclosed regulations.  This report argues that Japan’s government does not offer enough 
regulation and authority in the transportation and the justification thereof for MOX utilization.  It 
charges that Japanese law does not even classify the workers in their transportation cycle as 
transportation workers as defined by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), since 
doing so would require that such workers and their working conditions be monitored.  It argues 
that there would be no economic benefits for using foreign, reprocessed MOX fuel after taking 
 29 
into consideration all of the indirect costs that would be incurred in physical protection security, 
compensation costs to countries along the transportation routes should an accident occur, and 
cost of required insurance coverage.  The report concludes that the use of MOX fuel is 
unjustifiable and should not be continued.   
 
According to CNIC’s website, other activities include co-hosting several symposiums such as 
“International Conference on Plutonium” in 1991, “Asia-Pacific Forum on the Sea Shipments of 
Japanese Plutonium” in 1992, “Why Plutonium Now?” in 1993, and “Sustainable and Peaceful 
Energy Future” in 1997 with such groups as Greenpeace International, the United States Nuclear 
Control Institute, the Japan Nuclear Industrial Forum, and Friends of the Earth.  The 1993 
conference was the first attempt at debate between the CNIC and the Japanese nuclear industry.  
Recently, the CNIC, along with the Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs (see Section 
2.1.3.4), founded a committee to assess the criticality accident at the JCO Uranium Processing 
Plant in 1999.  In 2003 they hosted an open debate on “Thinking about the Reprocessing and 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy”.  In 2000, CNIC published a report refuting the Japan Nuclear Cycle 
Development Institute’s H12 Geological Disposal report (CNIC 2004).  
 
2.1.3.3 No Nukes Asia Forum 
The No Nukes Asia Forum (NNAF), according to its website, was born from the Anti-Nuclear 
Information Center in Korea in order to bring Asian countries together annually to discuss 
developments of nuclear programs across Asia and determine ways to stop such advances.  
NNAF opposes all nuclear energy in Asia and blames the Japanese government and electric 
companies for working together in order to promote and sell nuclear power to other Asian 
countries, namely Korea and Taiwan.  The Forum has been hosted by a different Asian country 
since 1993 where it was first held in Japan.  Over the past decade, NNAF has drawn many 
participants from many Asian countries including Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia (NNAF 
2004). 
 
2.1.3.4 Gensuikin 
Gensuikin, or the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs was initiated in 1965 in order to 
create relationships between Japan and other antinuclear groups worldwide, to work on 
campaigns to end dependence on nuclear energy and defense, and to aid radiation victims, 
namely, victims of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The Japan Congress Against 
A- and H-Bombs has grown to encompass chapters in 47 prefectures and support from 32 labor 
unions and youth groups in Japan.  Their primary activities include two annual events: March 1s, 
Bikini Day, to commemorate the exposure of the fishing boat Daigo Fukuryu-Maru to radiation 
from the 1954 U.S. testing at Bikini Atoll., and the August hosting of the World Congress 
Against A- and H-Bombs conference in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  In the words of their former 
chairman, Moritaki Ichirou, they contend that humans and nuclear technology, including nuclear 
energy, “cannot coexist” (Gensuikin 2003).   
 
2.1.3.5 Green Action 
Green Action, according to its website, is a relatively young citizen organization in Kyoto, Japan 
established in 1991.  It is active in collaboration with other similar groups in order to halt Japan’s 
plutonium and MOX fuel use programs.  Green Action’s specific foci are opposing the 
Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant located in the Aomori Prefecture of northern Japan, and the 
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Monju fast breeder reactor.  It states that MOX production at the Belgonucleaire facility in 
Belgium is substandard as well, and proposes that there is a manipulation of data as the facility 
refuses to release the quality control data. Green Action also petitions for and offers to 
intermediate negotiations between governments and utility companies and is available to pursue 
legal action.  In addition, Green Action works to provide information for policymakers, media, 
and the general public (Green Action 2004).  
 
2.1.3.6 BUND 
The website of BUND, the German branch of Friends of the Earth, describes civilian 
demonstration activities in Japan specifically related to the construction of the Hamaoka plant in 
the Tokai prefecture, a site where four nuclear reactors already operate.  Residents and 
sympathetic anti-nuclear opinion are worried that the Hamaoka facilities and physical 
surrounding area are not suitable for withstanding an earthquake, citing the fact that the plant 
plans propose construction over a major fault line.  BUND also seeks to raise awareness of the 
many cover-ups that have occurred due to self-inspection of the power plants without 
governmental regulation.  The BUND news release cites several demonstrations of Japanese 
antinuclear groups, including the Stop the Monju organization, involving speakers and masses of 
people carrying signs and shouting chants have taken place at critical times and locations, such 
as on November 19, 2002 at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry during the Diet’s 
deliberation of two nuclear-related bills (BUND 2002). 
 
2.1.3.7 Local Antinuclear Organizations 
A number of other local and smaller organizations are engaged in the Japanese antinuclear 
campaign, including Plaintiffs Against Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, People of Fukui Opposing 
Nuclear Power, and Stop the Monju.  According to the Plutonium Investigation plutonium online 
news based in Paris, France, the first, Plaintiffs Against Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, primarily 
opposes the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant, as the group is located in the Aomori Prefecture 
where the plant is situated as well.  Secondly, the People of Fukui Opposing Nuclear Power have 
a lot of antinuclear sentiment as the Fukui Prefecture has a high concentration of 15 nuclear 
power plants in a relatively small area of Japan.  Their most recent grievance has been the 
anticipated start-up of the Monju fastbreeder reactor.  Finally, the organization Stop the Monju is 
perhaps more far-reaching, campaigning nationally against the Monju fastbreeder reactor coming 
online (WISE-Paris 1998).   
 
2.1.4 International Opposition 
Consistent with many of the former antinuclear groups’ complaints, Michael Cross, a freelance 
journalist for the New Scientist writes in his February 1992 article, “Japan’s Plutonium 
Stockpile” that Tatsujiro Suzuki, a Japanese nuclear engineer from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Center for Energy Policy, estimates that 80 to 90 tons of plutonium will have 
accumulated in Japan by 2010.  Cross expresses concern at the effects this stockpile could 
develop, such as questions of Japan’s possible proliferation plans, and pressure on neighboring 
countries to keep up with Japan’s plutonium accretion (Cross 1992).  Considering the former 
assertion regarding possible implications, an article in the Washington Quarterly by Matake 
Kamiya (Kamiya 2002) states that in May 2002, the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuo 
Fukuda, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Shinzo Abe, made public statements recognizing 
 31 
that Japan’s Constitution allows for limited nuclear weapon possession for defensive purposes 
only.  However, Japan’s pacifist attitude continues to persist since World War II, confirming its 
current antinuclear position in its defense strategies.  Kamiya asserts that the Japanese public, 
and those more informed on such issues, have voiced their increase in opposition to development 
of a nuclear arsenal through polls taken in 1969, 1978, and 1981.  Kamiya contends that Japan 
has no need to begin such a defense program as long as it has its strong economy and friendship 
with the United States that assures its security.  She states that nuclear weapons proliferation 
would only prompt a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia and create tensions in other countries 
as well.  Though it has been more than 50 years since atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki the thought of Japanese nuclear proliferation is strongly opposed by the majority of 
Japanese public and policymakers. 
 
Moreover, the threat of the antinuclear extremist comes from many sources with much 
international support.  Large nuclear opposition organizations such as Greenpeace and the 
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center wield influence through international affiliations, yet more 
regional and local organizations such as No Nukes Asia Forum, the Japan Congress Against A- 
and H-Bombs, Green Action, Plutonium Action Hiroshima, as well as Plaintiffs Against Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Facilities, People of Fukui Opposing Nuclear Power, and Stop the Monju 
successfully organize protests and present information for the general public. 
2.2 Insider Threat 
The insider threat comprises the threat of the disgruntled employee, the criminal employee and 
potentially the employee forced into cooperation via coercion, or a psychotic employee.  The 
literature search does not include examples of the latter two possibilities.  
2.2.1 Disgruntled Employee 
The disgruntled employee threat has been almost unthinkable in Japan, given the history of 
Japan’s employment system.  Japanese workers tend to view their employment to a specific 
company as a reciprocal relationship where training, teamwork and hard work are emphasized 
and rewarded.  For Japanese, work is a significant contributor to self-identity and self-esteem and 
a strong loyalty to a specific company is therefore established.  Japanese sense of self-
accomplishment is highly integrated with company accomplishment.  Much energy is focused on 
ensuring harmony and collaboration within teams and is believed to be influenced by 
Confucianism and kinship ties in Japanese society.  A company’s relationship with its employees 
can therefore almost be described as paternalistic.  They continue to emphasize that training is 
also highly regarded for all levels of Japanese employment.  The prevailing practice is that 
employees are hired as general employees, and therefore throughout their lifetime transfer many 
times within a company, making outside job transfers an uncommon phenomenon.  Despite the 
prevalence of mutuality of company-employee relationships, only 30 to 40 percent of companies 
honor lifetime employment.  However, this loyalty echoes throughout Japanese employment.  In 
order to maintain the current percentage of lifetime employment promises, Japanese companies 
utilize subcontracting practices, thus forcing contractors to layoff their employees if need be, 
thereby protecting actual companies’ guarantees to their employees (Slem, Levi, and Young 
1993).   
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This Japanese employee loyalty may be in part born from the historical structure of Japanese 
businesses in which Keiretsu, modern versions of the original Zaibatsus, are conglomerates 
which fuse a bank and trading company as well as manufacturers in order to secure financial 
partnership and viability between different sectors of the economy.  After World War II, the 
Allied Forces were in the process of dividing up these monopolies of the Japanese market.   
However, with the rise of conflict in Korea and other Asian countries, they realized a strong 
Japan with a strong economy was necessary for stability in the region.  Thus, they encouraged 
the continuation and formation of two new conglomerates to produce the modern big six 
Keiretsu.  Through the practice of interlocking shares, the Keiretsu secure their viability and self-
sustenance by not allowing foreign companies to hold enough shares to own a company.  
Japanese economic dependence on Keiretsu keeps Japanese prices high, and creates efficiency 
by having only one company in any specific category of business.  Thus, employee loyalty to a 
company has been strong, and the ability to transfer within any specific conglomerate allows for 
both worker efficiency and satisfaction.  This system also encourages innovation due to the free 
flow of advances made in information and knowledge, which reduces research costs, and 
eventually leads to the creation of products of superior quality (Evans).   
 
This loyalty may be beginning to erode because recent economic dislocations have hit businesses 
hard, and layoffs have begun to occur.  Major companies in Japan including Toshiba and Hitachi, 
Japan’s largest manufacturers of computer chips and electrical machinery, respectively, planned 
to layoff up to 10 percent of their labor forces workers as did electronics producers Matsushita 
Electric and NEC.(Conachy 2001).  The unemployment rate in Japan stands at 4.8% in August 
2004.  This is partially due to the fact that many Japanese are voluntarily separating from their 
jobs in search for better employment.  However, much is due to the decade-long recession that 
has gripped the Japanese economy (Kageyama 2004). 
 
Layoffs pose hardships for Asian companies since loyalty to companies has been elemental in an 
employee’s relationship to the company in the past.  Many Asian employees reportedly signed 
over their annual bonuses or endured pay cuts in order to save jobs and companies.  Layoffs are 
an extreme last resort in Asia, and most companies are only recently being forced to succumb to 
such managerial practices that are common in the United States.   Some massive layoffs have 
been executed better than others, resulting in different levels of responses, fluctuating from 
feelings of betrayal to feelings of disappointment; however, all employees apparently seem to 
understand the company’s economic dilemma.  One company that was relatively successful in 
performing layoffs notified all of its employees that were to be eliminated within just a few hours 
and gave them a few days to gather their personal items and computer files.  In contrast, another 
company informed the unfortunate employees via an impersonal letter and did not allow them to 
gather their things.  According to the article, the latter example especially illustrates a trend of 
erosion in company-employee loyalty (Gharemani 2001). 
 
2.2.2 Criminal Employee 
According to “Economic Crime Survey 2003” conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers Financial 
Advisory Services, the threat of economic crime in Japan is significant, if not increasing in 
recent times.  The survey found that 13 percent of Japanese companies report that economic 
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crime has occurred between 2001 and 2003, and that asset misappropriation is the most prevalent 
crime reported.  Companies acknowledge that crimes such as misrepresentation, cybercrime, 
corruption, and bribery are much less visible crimes and are reported less often, though they are 
believed to be much more common than statistics indicate.  Corporations that are reported to 
suffer most from fraud include financial services, such as banking and insurance companies, and 
highly regulated corporations, which may not incur more crime, but only have better avenues for 
detection.   
 
Large corporations, with an employee base of greater than 1,000, tend to incur more employee 
crime than smaller corporations with an employee base of less than 1,000—37 percent versus 48 
percent—because in the larger corporations there is more opportunity for coworker collusion, 
more multifarious finances, and more distance from the core of the industry, allowing employees 
to experience more freedom, while at the same time less guilt.  While only a reported 15 percent 
of Japanese companies were insured against the incident of fraud, 98 percent of sufferers of such 
activity were only able to recover 20 percent of what they lost.  An important aspect of corporate 
crime in Japan is that it results not only in economic losses, but also loss of loyalty between 
employees and businesses on personal as well as business levels.   
 
Despite these seemingly significant losses, only eight percent of Japanese industries provide 
antifraud training for their employees.  The survey explicitly states that Japan needs to consider 
creating and requiring such training since the global community has recently placed much 
importance on uncovering and combating fraud in the workplace.  Due to the historically 
reciprocal loyal nature of Japanese businesses and its employees, companies largely rely on the 
honor system in preventing corporate crime, and are very unlikely to implement training to 
prevent, measures to uncover, or punishment for such activity.  Looking to the near future, the 
“Economic Crime Survey 2003” illustrates that Japanese companies are mostly concerned about 
cybercrime – 59 percent – and product piracy and counterfeiting – 46 percent.  Though this 
indicates increased concern, Japan still has many opportunities for improving its managerial 
practices in order to reduce the risk and occurrence of corporate crime (PWC 2003). 
 
Studies of the history and structure of Japan’s employment system show that the environment of 
Japanese employment may be changing.  This, together with the overlooked occurrence of 
corporate crime, can aid in determining the insider threat.   
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3.  Summary and Conclusions 
This report summarizes a review of the open literature concerning threats, including sabotage 
and theft, related to fissile material transport in Japan in order to aid in the development of a 
subsequent design basis threat.  The design basis threat consists of the external threats of the 
terrorist, criminal, and extremist, and the insider threats of the disgruntled employee, the criminal 
employee and potentially the employee forced into cooperation via coercion or a psychotic 
employee. 
 
Beginning with the external threat, the terrorist threat is determined by Japanese demographics; 
known terrorist groups in Japan including the Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-Ha, and 
Seikijuku; and international relations.  Japan has a relatively homogenous population, ethnically 
and religiously, although a history of terrorism is illustrated by known terrorist groups in Japan.  
The Red Army’s goals were to overthrow the Japanese government and ignite global revolution 
using revolutionary violence.  The Red Army split up into three factions: the Yodo Group, the 
Japanese Red Army, and the United Red Army, operating in North Korea, Lebanon, and Japan, 
respectively.  Each faction eventually adopted a local doctrine and set of goals, although their 
plots of global revolution never came to fruition. They did succeed in inciting fear and 
intimidation worldwide.  The Aum Shinrikyo, now called Aleph, organization sought spiritual 
enlightenment in a modern world where westernization and materialism seemed to be the focus 
of Japanese society.  The religious aspect of Aum Shinrikyo spiraled out of control, and 
members engaged in illegal and terrorist acts, most notably the Matsumoto incident and 1995 
Tokyo subway sarin attack.  These episodes had strong global repercussions.  Aum Shinrikyo no 
longer has religious organizational privileges, and remains under the surveillance of the Japanese 
government.  Chukaku-Ha, the Middle Core Faction or Nucleus, sought to demonstrate 
frustration with what they considered Japan’s imperialism, the imperialism of the West, and the 
Gulf War through protests and some violence in the form of rudimentary rockets and incendiary 
devices.  Seikijuku, or Sane Thinkers School, is a right-wing group whose goal is to keep 
prominent the role of the Emperor in Japan.   
 
International relations and policies also affect Japan’s security.  Japanese support of the United 
States’ wars on terrorism and Iraq may result in terrorist activity on its islands of the sort 
represented by the Madrid train bombings in 2004.  The reality of this threat is indicated by the 
discovery of Al Qaeda advocates in Japan.  The Council on Foreign Relations contends that 
Japan is vulnerable to an attack from North Korea, due to its close proximity and good relations 
with the United States.  The possibility was made very clear when North Korea launched a long-
range Taepodong Missile over the Japanese islands in August 1998 as well as the testing and 
deployment of medium-range Nodong missiles capable of reaching Japan.  Japan holds several 
grievances against North Korea as well, notably its weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation, 
including the kidnappings of 11 Japanese in the early 1980s, which continue to hamper progress 
towards improving relations. Japan is a relatively peaceful nation, but its history illustrates that it 
is not immune to terrorism.   
 
The criminal threat takes into account Japan’s crime rate.  Overall, Japan’s crime rate appears to 
be relatively small.  However, sources note that the foreign crime rate is increasing as the amount 
of foreign nationals in Japan increase as well.   
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The antinuclear extremist threat is defined by the threats of several international, as well as local, 
antinuclear groups including Greenpeace, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, No Nukes Asia 
Forum, Green Action, Plutonium Action Hiroshima, BUND, Plaintiffs Against Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Facilities, People of Fukui Opposing Nuclear Power, and Stop the Monju.  All of these 
groups collaborate to protest nuclear technology, especially transportation of MOX fuel and 
nuclear proliferation.  Examples of such demonstrations include Greenpeace boarding the 
British-flagged Pacific Swan as it passed through the Panama Canal to hang a “stop plutonium” 
sign onboard the vessel.  For several of the large organizations including Greenpeace, Citizens’ 
Nuclear Information Center, and BUND, there is much international support, and therefore 
generous amounts of money and people supporting their antinuclear causes. 
 
The insider threat must first consider the threat of the disgruntled employee.  Throughout Japan’s 
history, Japanese tended to view their employment by a specific company as a reciprocal 
relationship where training, teamwork, and hard work are emphasized and awarded.  This loyalty 
may have been the result of the formation of the Keiretsu which helped to ensure lifetime 
employment through collaborations between production businesses, banks, and trading 
companies.  However, sources note that recent economic difficulties have hit businesses hard, 
and layoffs have begun to occur.  Acknowledgement of this trend may aid in determining the 
insider threat along with the threats of the employee forced into cooperating via coersion and the 
psychotic employee.  The threat of the criminal employee must acknowledge the occurrence of 
economic crime in Japan—reported and unreported—and Japan’s lack of motivation to 
implement systems to prevent such activity. The honor code is an important element in the 
Japanese culture and may be one of the reasons that Japan has not implemented systems to 
prevent these economic crimes.  However, it should be noted that the honor code may not be a 
perfect deterrent, since one in 10 Japanese corporations have reported themselves as victims of 
corporate fraud from 2001 to 2003. 
 
Any design basis threat must take into consideration the factors of external and insider threats.  
This report summarizes a review of open literature sources for information on potential threats, 
including sabotage and theft, related to fissile material transport in Japan to aid in the 
development of such a design basis threat.   
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